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Conviction Nixed, But No Wrongful Imprisonment Suit for Poz Man
Iowa Supreme Court says original guilty plea bars Nick Rhoades’ damages claim
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
I n an unfortunate turnabout, the Iowa Supreme Court unanimously ruled on April 15 that Nick Rhoades, whose guilty-plea conviction to one count of 
criminal transmission of HIV was reversed by 
that court two years ago, could not bring an 
action for damages against the state under its 
Wrongful Imprisonment Statute. That law, the 
high court argued, does not allow claims by 
those who pled guilty. 
The Iowa court declined to follow rulings in 
some other states interpreting similar statutes 
that have allowed such lawsuits when a guilty 
plea was vacated on appeal.
Rhoades met a man identified in court pro-
ceedings as A.P. — but widely reported else-
where as Adam Plendl — through a social 
networking website. After exchanging mes-
sages, Plendl invited Rhoades to his home 
and they had unprotected oral sex but anal 
sex with a condom. Plendl believed Rhoades 
to be HIV-negative based on his online pro-
file, but they did not discuss the issue before 
having sex. 
When Plendl subsequently learned that 
Rhoades was HIV-positive, he contacted law 
enforcement and Rhoades was charged with 
criminal transmission of HIV under an Iowa 
statute subsequently repealed in part due to 
the publicity surrounding this case. A new law 
was enacted that better reflects the current 
science on HIV transmission.
Rhoades pled guilty to the charge and was 
sentenced to 25 years in prison, lifetime 
parole, and a requirement to register as a 
sex offender. No evidence was presented that 
Plendl was infected with HIV, and the statute 
at that time did not require evidence of actu-
al transmission, merely exposure that could 
cause transmission.
Rhoades filed a motion to reconsider the 
sentence, stressing the lack of transmission, 
and the district court suspended the prison 
sentence and placed him on five years’ pro-
bation. In an application for post-conviction 
relief, Rhoades claimed his trial counsel pro-
vided ineffective assistance by letting him 
plead guilty when there was, in his view, no 
factual basis for the charge. 
Rhoades argued that because his viral load 
was virtually undetectable at the time he had 
sex with Plendl, the chance that he would 
transmit the virus, even through unprotected 
anal sex — which was not alleged — was slight, 
and certainly not sufficient to meet the stan-
dard of guilt under the statute, which required 
“the intentional exposure of the body of one 
person to a bodily fluid of another person in a 
manner that could result in the transmission 
of the human immunodeficiency virus.”
This was described in the statute as “inti-
mate contact.” At the time of his guilty plea, 
the trial judge asked Rhoades if he had 
engaged in “intimate contact” with Plendl, 
without any explanation by the judge or 
Rhoades’ trial counsel of the meaning of that 
term. Rhoades could well have believed he had 
violated the statute without having engaged in 
anal sex.
Although the trial and intermediate appellate 
courts rejected his motion, the Iowa Supreme 
Court in 2014 reversed because, as Justice 
Brent R. Appel writes in the current decision, 
“We concluded that the district court had used 
technical terms from the statute but that such 
conclusory terms were insufficient to establish 
that the defendant acknowledged facts consis-
tent with the completion of the crime. We fur-
ther noted the minutes of testimony and the 
pre-sentence investigation report did not pro-
vide a factual basis for the element of intimate 
contact.”
The Supreme Court had also concluded that 
“in light of advances in medicine” the record 
contained “insufficient evidence to show that 
Rhoades exchanged bodily fluids with A.P. or 
intentionally exposed A.P. to the disease.” 
By vacating the guilty plea, the court was 
not concluding that Rhoades was innocent, 
but rather that a new trial was needed to 
determine his guilt, either through a properly 
informed guilty plea or a trial.
The state chose not to pursue another trial 
but instead dropped the charges.
Rhoades is now asserting a claim under 
Iowa law for “wrongful imprisonment.” That 
provision provides relief if two tests are met: 
“the individual did not plead guilty to the pub-
lic offense charged, or to any lesser included 
offense, but was convicted by the court or by 
a jury of an offense classified as an aggravat-
ed misdemeanor or felony,” and the claimant 
proves “by a clear and convincing preponder-
ance of the evidence that the claimant is actu-
ally innocent.”
The legislature, in this way, was preventing 
damage claims by somebody who was con-
victed but then got off on a technicality. The 
Supreme Court pointed out that Rhoades 
would have to prove his innocence under the 
law that has since been repealed in order to 
win relief.
The focus of the case, however, was on the 
interpretation of the guilty plea language. 
Rhoades argued, with support from cases 
outside of Iowa, that a guilty plea vacated or 
nullified as the result of an appellate ruling 
should not stand in the way of a “wrongful 
imprisonment” claim. The Iowa court did not 
accept this argument. 
First, it pointed out, the statutory language 
was clear and did not include any statement, 
as was found in other states’ laws, softening 
the guilty plea bar in certain circumstances. 
Appel noted that the legislature has specifically 
provided, in another statute, an out for those 
who have pled guilty but are later exonerated 
by DNA evidence, showing that if it “intended 
to provide relief to those who plead guilty, it 
knows how to do it.”
The court also observed that in a case 
resolved by a guilty plea, the lack of a trial 
record means there is no contemporane-
ous basis on which to determine whether the 
claimant can prove actual innocence.
Even as the court acknowledged the case 
against Rhoades seeking compensation lacked 
airtight logic, it retreated to a narrow view of its 
role in statutory interpretation.
“Although there are substantial arguments 
that a guilty plea should not disqualify a claim-
ant from seeking compensation for wrongful 
imprisonment in all instances,” Appel wrote, 
“we conclude … that the legislature made a dif-
ferent judgment in 1997” when it enacted the 
statute. “Our job is to do the best we can in 
interpreting the meaning of legislation. We do 
not expand the scope of legislation based upon 
policy preferences.”
The resulting conclusion, Appel wrote, is a 
“narrow but not impractical or absurd result.
Rhoades is represented in this appeal by 
attorney Dan Johnston of Des Moines. Since 
the case revolves entirely around an inter-
pretation of an Iowa statute, there appears 
no basis to seek further review from the US 
Supreme Court.
Nick Rhoades addresses the Presidential Council on HIV/ AIDS in 
2012.
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